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Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 8 (March 5, 2020)1 
 
CIVIL APPEAL: HOA LIENS, PARTIAL PAYMENTS, SUPERPRIORITY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that homeowners may cure defaults as to superpriority portions of 
HOA liens much like first deed of trust holders; however, failure to explicitly or implicitly direct 
allocation of payments by either debtors or creditors requires court intervention to decide what is 
“just and equitable.” 
 
Background 
  
I. 
 This dispute arose when the former owner of 9352 Cranesbill Court (the Property) fell 
behind on her payments to the homeowner’s association (HOA) for community assessments. The 
HOA initiated foreclosure proceedings which involved recording a delinquent assessment lien, a 
notice of default, and a notice of foreclosure sale. The superpriority portion of the lien totaled 
$534. After receiving the notice of delinquency, the homeowner made partial payments to the 
HOA in the amount of $798.50. Although the homeowner did not specify how she wanted the 
HOA to apply the payments––to the superpriority or subpriority portions of the lien––if all of the 
homeowner’s payments were applied to the superpriority, the sale to the holder of the first deed of 
trust would have been rendered void. Despite the homeowner’s partial payments, she owed 
$3,932.58 at the time of the foreclosure sale. The Property was purchased for $4,900 and deeded 
to Teal Petals St. Trust. 
 
 Litigation contesting whether the sale extinguished the first deed of trust began between 
the holder of the first deed of trust, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Teal Petals and its assignors. The 
case appeared before the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court 
held because the homeowner’s payments exceeded the default superpriority lien amount, the 
foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust. As a result, the buyer’s assignee’s argument 
that only the first deed of trust holder could cure the superpriority lien default was rejected and 
summary judgment was granted to Wells Fargo and denied to Teal Petals. 
  
Discussion 
  
II. 
 Teal Petals, Appellant(s), asserted the homeowner’s payments could not cure the default 
on the superpriority because it was in default when the foreclosure sale occurred and that sale 
extinguished Wells Fargo’s first deed of trust. Teal Petals alternatively argued that even if the 
homeowner’s payments could cure the superpriority default, it was not cured in this case because 
there was no evidence the homeowner or the HOA allocated the payments to the superpriority. 
Wells Fargo contended the district court correctly determined the homeowner and the first deed of 
trust holder could cure the superpriority lien default. 
 
1  By Brittney Lehtinen. 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada reviews grants or denials of summary judgment de novo 
and determines summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings viewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain in 
dispute.2 
  
II.A. 
 The district court determined NRS Chapter 116 does not limit who can cure the default on 
a superpriority lien and that it was possible for the homeowner’s payments to cure the default in 
this case. The Appellants argued the district court erred because NRS 116.3116(2), the 
superpriority lien statute, requires first deed of trust holder to cure such defaults. 
  
 Appellants relied on reports from the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts 
to argue only the first deed of trust holder could cure the superpriority default; however, they failed 
to provide binding legal authority or statutory language requiring the first deed of trust holder to 
do so. Moreover, the Appellants did not provide binding legal authority prohibiting homeowners 
from curing such liens. The Court noted that homeowners are in fact incentivized to cure 
superpriority defaults to preserve the deed of trust. Relying on NRS Chapter 116, the Court 
declined to find statutory support for Appellants’ arguments and found that both the first deed of 
trust holder and homeowner have the option to pay off superpriority lien defaults. Thus, the Court 
affirmed the district court holding that the homeowner could cure the default. 
   
II.B. 
Appellants further argued that if homeowners can cure superpriority defaults, the 
homeowner in this case did not do so because her payments were less than the full delinquent lien 
amount. Appellants also argued no evidence was produced to show the HOA applied the 
homeowner’s payments to the superpriority. Wells Fargo argued the payments cured the 
superpriority default because the amount of the payments exceeded the superpriority portion.  
 
The Court relied on Able Electric, Inc. v. Kaufman, which addresses rules that courts follow 
when deciding how to allocate partial payments. Able Electric states generally that debtors have 
the right to make and direct an appropriation of partial payments, but when the debtor does not 
direct the application of payments, the creditor may make the determination.3 If neither creditor 
nor debtor makes a specific application of payment, it becomes a matter for the court to decide 
using basic principles of justice and equity to reach a fair result.4 When applying the Able Electric 
rule, this court has determined that “equity and justice” is best served through a disposition most 
favorable to the creditor at the time of appropriation.5  
 
Resolving this issue may vary depending on how the district court classifies the unpaid 
HOA assessments and other costs the homeowner was required to pay––whether they were on a 
running account and thus a single debt or multiple accounts. If the district court considers them to 
be multiple accounts where neither debtor nor creditor exercised the power to direct application of 
payment, the payment is to be applied to debts the creditor would have applied it to with regard to 
 
2  Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
3  104 Nev. 29, 30–32, 752 P.2d 218, 220. 
4  Id. at 32, 752 P.2d at 220. 
5  Id. at 33, 752 P.2d at 220. 
the interest of third persons, the debtor, and the creditor.6 Generally, in that case, the payments are 
allocated to debts to third persons.7  
 
 II.C. 
 The Court briefly discussed the parties’ failing arguments deciding 1) even if Teal Petals 
qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value, such status does not override the void sale resulting 
from a foreclosure sale proceeding despite a cured default and 2) Wells Fargo cannot argue the 
sale should be set aside as commercially unreasonable because the district court did not include 
that determination in its order and this court does not address issues the district court did not 
directly resolve.8 
 
Conclusion 
 
III. 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s legal determination that both 
homeowners and first deed of trust holders can cure superpriority lien defaults; however, the case 
was vacated and remanded for the parties to brief and for the district court to determine the proper 
allocation of the homeowner’s partial payments. 
 
 
6  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 260(1) (2019). 
7  Id. at § 260(2)(a). 
8  Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 583, 592 n.6, 262 P.3d 699, 704 n.6 (2011). 
